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Affirmative Action After Grutter: Reflections on a
Tortured Death, Imagining a Humanity-Affirming
Reincarnation
Rhonda V. Magee Andrews*
Affirmative action is part of a human dream, one that we
venture to call universal. All human beings want good,
useful, decent lives for themselves and their children....
There is joy in deciding to take on the whole world as home,
treating every path as sacred, treating every person as
deserving respect and care, taking less so that all the children
are fed, needing less so that your soul can sleep in peace.
Charles R. Lawrence and Mari J. Matsuda'
I. INTRODUCTION
Though the moribund state of affirmative action law fueled racial
remedies scholarship for the past ten years or more,2 the Supreme
Court's decision in the Grutter case this past summer breathed a bit
of stale life into the ailing affirmative action movement. Professor
Michael Higginbotham's hypothetical closing argument in the
Grutter and Gratz cases provides a succinct and straightforward
articulation of what indeed appears to have been the most viable
Copyright 2003, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor of Law, University of San Francisco School of Law. J.D., M.A.,
1993, University of Virginia. B.A., 1989, University of Virginia. These comments
benefitted immensely from the rousing roundtable discussions at the two-day
symposium at The LSU Law Center, March 12 and 13, 2003. Thanks also to
Professor John Denvir, Nitin Subhedar and Daniel J. O'Connell for comments on
previous drafts; and to Gavin Sammarco and Tammy Higgins for indispensable
research assistance.
1. Charles R. Lawrence & Mari J. Matsuda, We Won't Go Back: Making the
Case for Affirmative Action 8 (1997).
2. Indeed, in a previous article, I discussed the waning support for affirmative
action and the link between that phenomenon and the rise in calls for reparations.
See Rhonda V. Magee, Note, The Master's Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses
to African-American Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies
Discourse, 79 Va. L. Rev. 863 (1993) (decrying the backlash against affirmative
action as indicative of a prevailing, if largely unconscious, white supremacist world
view). See also Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the
CaseforBlackReparations?, 40 B.C. L. Rev. 429,429-32 (1998) (setting the stage
for an argument encouraging the reconsideration of reparations as a "critical
legalism" by stating that "[alffirnative action for Black Americans as a form of
remediation for perpetuation of past injustice is almost dead.").
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argument in support of affirmative action.3 Tightly focused on the
diversity rationale which the Supreme Court's opinions ultimately
endorsed,4 Professor Higginbotham's argument seeks to situate the
challenged programs comfortably within the cramped spaces left
open begrudgingly by prevailing interpretations of the applicable
Constitutional law.5
But insofar as he succeeds in fitting his argument within the
contours of prevailing law, Professor Higginbotham demonstrates
beautifully the law's limits, irrationalities, and near fatal lack of
transformative potential. Thus, while articulating the pro-affirmative
action argument with the greatest appeal to the Court's moderate
center, Professor Higginbotham's argument, like the Supreme Court
doctrine upon which it depends, sets aside affirmative action's main
practical effect and most pressing aboriginal objectives-redressing
discrimination and segregation by increasing opportunities for
marginalized groups-as tangential.
In the following few pages, I argue that the standard "diversity"
rationale for affirmative action, though of obvious appeal, is not a
remedial or corrective justice-based rationale, and hence, fails to
address the central concerns of traditionally disadvantaged groups.
Indeed, the diversity rationale exemplifies the imposition of a largely
exogenous-though admittedly often compatible and generally
beneficial-objective upon the legal agenda of traditionally
3. Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct.
2325 (2003); Michael Higginbotham & Kathleen Bergin, Why the University of
Michigan Should Win in Grutter and Gratz, 63 La. L. Rev. 697 (2003).
4. See, e.g., Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318-19, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 2762-63 (1978):
Our conclusion that the Law School has a compelling interest in a
diverse student body is informed by our view that attaining a diverse
student body is at the heart of the Law School's proper institutional
mission, and that "good faith" on the part of a university is "presumed"
absent "a showing to the contrary."
Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2415:
Because the University's use of race in its current freshman admissions
policy is not narrowly tailored to achieve respondents' asserted interest
in diversity, the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause. For the
reasons set forth in Grutter v. Bollinger, aute, at 123 S. Ct 2338-41,
the Court has today rejected petitioners' argument that diversity cannot
constitute a compelling state interest. However, the Court finds that
the University's current policy, which automatically distributes 20
points, or one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission, to
every single 'underrepresented minority' applicant solely because of
race, is not narrowly tailored to achieve educational diversity.
5. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 110 S. Ct.
2997 (1990)); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989);
Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000).
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marginalized groups. To better reflect the insight of those groups,
and to better approximate just results, the justifications for
affirmative action must be revised and broadened.
In Section 11, I argue that the most compelling justifications for
affirmative action-remedying the effects of segregation,
discrimination, and related past and present forms of systemic
subordination which have undermined educational and other
opportunities for traditionally oppressed groups-have curiously
received little support from the courts.6  These discarded
justifications not only lend much-needed moral force to the
arguments in favor of affirmative action but, if employed, would
strengthen the claims to legitimacy of ajustice system with a history
of supporting racial oppression. I then briefly suggest, in Section III,
a new way of thinking about what I believe is the larger project at the
root of affirmative action-the continuing Reconstruction of post-
slavery America. I call upon advocates of reform and Reconstruction
to work toward forging a new, deeper commitment to the remedial
goals of affirmative action as a preliminary step toward (1)
embracing a jurisprudence focused on the essential human dignity
interests which make our tradition of racialist thought and policy so
repugnant, a legal philosophy based on what I have called "humanity
consciousness," and (2) articulating a broad agenda of reformist
policies and programs consistent therewith.7
6. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Law and Misdirection in the Debate Over
Affirmative Action, 2002 U. Chi. Legal F. 11, 23,34-35,41-43 (noting the original
remedial justification for affirmative action; arguing that the "miscast reliance on
diversity" forecloses proper inquiry into the link between affirmative action and
"historic redress or societal obligation for integration;" and arguing for a return to
viewing the equal protection clause as embodying "a commitment to the legacies
of group-based discrimination"); Charles R. Lawrence, III, Essay, Two Views of the
River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense ofAffirmative Action, 101 Colum. L. Rev.
928, 964-68 (2001) [hereinafter "Two Views"] (arguing for "transformative
politics," aimed at raising the consciousness of the "privileged" supporters of
affirmative action regarding the need to go beyond arguing in favor of diversity to
pursue a "more radical vision of equality"); Charles R. Lawrence, Symposium, In
Honor of Professor Trina Grillo: Legal Education For A Diverse World: Article:
Each Other's Harvest: Diversity's Deeper Meaning, 31 U.S.F. L. Rev. 757,
764-74 (1997) (arguing that the diversity rationale for affirmative action must be
grounded in the interest in undermining racism, or else is "substanceless").
7. See Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, infra note 33, at 489, 544-46 (describing
"humanity consciousness" as a normative and cognitive framework that centers
awareness on our common humanity and the dignitary imperatives implicit therein
with distinct jurisprudential implications). Compare Lawrence, Two Views, supra
note 6 at 965-66 (calling for an approach which aims to raise the consciousness of
those privileged by systems of subordination as to the "profound costs associated
with inequality" and "requires looking beyond winning or losing the particular legal
dispute or political battle and asking how one's actions serve to reinforce people's
awareness of our interdependence and mutual responsibility as members of the
2003] 707
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II. SETTING ASIDE DIVERSITY: RECLAIMING THE JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ROOTED IN TRADITIONAL REMEDIAL
THEORY AND NOTIONS OF CORRECTIVE JUSTICE
The rationale most widely embraced for the use of affirmative
action in education, and the one upon which Professor
Higginbotham's arguments consequently and almost necessarily rest,
is the goal of ensuring diverse educational environments.! The
University of Michigan's affirmative action programs should be
validated, the argument runs, because they amount to legitimate
efforts to maintain the kind of diverse classrooms which redound to
the benefit of all the students, including those entitled to be there
based on "merit" alone.9 This was, of course, the rationale endorsed
most strongly in Justice O'Connor's opinion in Grutter, upholding
the affirmative action program at Michigan Law School."
It is important to keep in mind, however, that the closing thoughts
argued by Professor Higginbotham's hypothetical lawyers on
Michigan's behalf might have been shaped differently, or rather,
quite a bit more radically. For example, instead of essentially
conceding their legitimacy as indicia of merit in the admissions
process, Michigan's lawyers might have mounted a strong challenge
to the criteria upon which the "merit" argument is based-the SAT,
LSAT and GPA-pointing out their inherent biases and questionable
claims to legitimacy.' Or, they might have developed a stronger
case for the use of affirmative action to remedy past and present
discrimination at the University of Michigan, which could no doubt
have been factually established. 2
Higginbotham's hypothetical lawyers eschew those and other
more radically transformative arguments in favor of one with perhaps
the most plausible chance of garnering the Supreme Court's backing,
one that would not impugn the reputation of the University of
human family").
8. Higginbotham & Bergin, supra note 3, at 698-99.
9. Id. at 698.
10. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2345 (2003).
11. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents Kimberley James, et al at 3-5, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003) (No. 02-241).
12. See, e.g., Brief for Leadership Conference on Civil Rights as Amici Curiae,
Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325; Brief on Behalf of a committee of concerned Black
Graduates of ABA Accredited Law Schools: Vicky L. Beasley, et al. as Amici
Curiae at 10-11, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325; Brief for American Sociological
Association, et al. as Amici Curiae at 288, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325; Brief for Black
Women's Law Association of Greater Chicago as Amici Curiae at 26-27, Grutter,
123 S. Ct. 2325. Brief for Amherst College, et al. as Amici Curiae at 9, 11, Grutter,
123 S. Ct. 2325.
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Michigan regarding any past and present race discrimination, and the
one least threatening to the status quo.13 The argument is nearly
exclusively focused on the diversity rationale, with only tangential
references to the goals of integration, desegregation, and improvinA
educational opportunity for students from disadvantaged groups.
Pragmatically, this makes sense; after all, the University of Michigan
had itself focused expertly on the diversity rationale in presenting its
case for affirmative action." And the most viable precedent-Justice
Powell's opinion in Bakke-identified the First Amendment interests
underlying a University's interest in a diverse class of students as an
important and compelling governmental interest, the only such
interest among the many proffered in support of the affirmative
action programs at issue there.' 6 Thus, the framing of the case around
the diversity justification naturally illustrates a sound legal strategy.
Nevertheless, resting the argument for affirmative action solely
on the First Amendment-based diversity rationale is not without its
troubling implications and consequences. Among the most
compelling critiques of the diversity rationale from the perspective
of a progressive race theorist have been those asserted by Professor
Charles Lawrence." Professor Lawrence argues that the courts have
endorsed a "shallow" notion of diversity--one which does not
explicitly concern itself with the use of diversity to dismantle the
legacies of slavery and segregation, namely, internalized and
institutionalized racism and the systemic miseducation of Blacks,
Mexicans, Native Americans and others traditionally subjected to
discrimination and still suffering from its effects. I8 Indeed, Professor
Lawrence contends that a shallow notion of diversity serves the
interests of the status quo better than those of the traditionally
disadvantaged.19 He insists, as did Justice Marshall in the early days
of the Civil Rights movement, that integration and remedying
continuing societal discrimination must be among the legitimate
13. See Lawrence, Two Views, supra note 7, at 940.
14. Higginbotham & Bergin supra note 3, at 699-700.
15. See, e.g., Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339-40 (summarizing the University of
Michigan Law School's argument, and supporting briefs from Michigans amici);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2003). See also Brief for Respondents
University of Michigan at 2329-33, 36, 38, 39, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (No. 02-
241); Brief for Respondents University of Michigan at 2414, 20, 25, 31, 39, Gratz,
123 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 02-516); Brief for Respondents Kimberley James, et al. at 19,
28-30, 49, Grutter, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (No. 02-241).
16. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,312-13, 16,98 S. Ct.
2733, 2759-62 (1978).
17. See, e.g., Lawrence, Two Views, supra note 6.
18. Id. at951-52.
19. Id. at 946.
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justifications for an affirmative action program.'0 He insists that the
courts adopt a view of affirmative action's justification that is not just
forward-looking, but backward-looking too.2' In other words,
Professor Lawrence continues to press for a view that justifies
affirmative action as a remedial tool.22
I agree with Professor Lawrence. For several reasons, it makes
sound jurisprudential sense to base the argument for affirmative
action on a remedial theory, a theory of corrective justice, rather than
on a notion of diversity based on a utilitarian, distributive justice
theory of the overall educational good. The plain fact is that
affirmative action would be neither necessary nor acceptable were it
not for the history and ongoing operation of racism in the United
States, for so long explicitly sanctioned by law. As many scholars
have pointed out, the courts have wrongly rejected the relevance of
this history.23 Indeed, while the courts have rejected these remedial
justifications, many of society's traditional outsiders, and their
advocates within the legal academy, have not.24 Many of the
20. Indeed, in the Bakke opinion, not only Justice Marshall, but three other
Justices-Brennan, White and Blackmun-voted to uphold the use of affirmative
action, including quota systems, "to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by
past racial prejudice." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 325, 98 S. Ct. at 2766 (joint opinion of
Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, J.J., concurring in judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (cited in Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325,2328 (2003)). See
also Issacharoff, supra note 6, at 23:
The early rationale for affirnative action, whether in the initial
Philadelphia Plan formulation or in its academic counterparts, was clearly
integrationist. Society was taking responsibility for minorities' past
subordination.... No one seriously claimed that the prime benefit would
come from the improvement of the internal life of the affected institutions
.... Diversity, as articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke, poorly captures
this integrationist spirit.
21. Lawrence, Two Views, supra note 6, at 952-53.
22. Id. at 941,946,954 (discussing the liberal justification ofaffirmative action
as premised upon acceptance of the policies as tools for the betterment of the
privileged (typically white) class); id. at 951-52 ("The original vision ofaffirmative
action proceeded from the perspective of the subordinated .... " who "sought
redress for their communities.") (emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., Neil Gotanda,A Critique of "Our Constitution is Colorblind," 44
Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1991); Isacharoff, supra note 6.
24. See, e.g., "Excerpts from the Affirmative Action Town Hall," 5 A. C. S.
News, Summer 2003, at 6-7. (quoting Professor Charles Ogletree as stating, "those
who oppose affirmative action are opposing a very modest and conservative remedy
for centuries of racial oppression" and "[a]ffirmative action is the most
conservative, the most modest, the most minuscule response to a horrific history
that we've had. And it hasn't stopped. If you think I'm lying, ask Amadou Diallo.
If you think I'm lying, ask Abner Luima. .. ." and, quoting Robin Lenhardt,
Georgetown fellow and former clerk to U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer,
as stating, "[i]f there is an adverse decision in the Michigan cases, what we will see
is the resegregation of institutions of higher education. I don't mean one or two.
[Vol. 63
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staunchest advocates of racial justice have merely "gone along with"
the near-exclusive focus on diversity; after all, Constitutionally, they
have been left with no other choice. They have acquiesced in the
"diversity movement" as the only Constitutionally acceptable means
of furthering a remedially-motivated integrationist agenda.
Yet the ability to do so requires that the courts continue to define
diversity in a way which, despite its stated utilitarian objectives and
denial of the existence of harms in need of legally-supported
remedy, permits the tacit pursuit of broadly remedial programs. In
Grutter the court elected to continue this charade, expressly denying
the Constitutional viability of a broadly remedial justification for
affirmative action, but endorsing an approach which permits the tacit
application of remedial approaches.
There are several good reasons, however, to continue to pressure
the courts to straightforwardly adopt a remedial approach to
affirmative action. The first is that a remedial justification would
better ground these practices within bedrock principles of American
law. Put simply, the American legal system is premised upon the
notion of providing remedies for harms done. The injuries of
centuries of state-sponsored, race-based oppression, from slavery to
Jim Crow and beyond, are among the most egregious wrongs this
society has ever known; in the view of many, they represent
paradigmatic crimes against humanity." Thus, the legitimacy and
integrity of a justice system ostensibly focused on providing
remedies for harms demands that a harm of this magnitude be
systemically addressed. If not, then for what does the American
justice system ultimately stand?
Secondly, the affirmative action jurisprudence adopted by the
courts since Bakke has led to the ultimate continuing injury within
a system nominally focused on justice: the courts themselves have
outright denied the existence of the unremedied injuries which result
from what we call racism and discrimination. By refusing a broad
remedial justification for affirmative action, the courts have denied
the very existence of the harm against which the remedial justice
apparatus of our society should be most vigilantly arrayed.
Finally, the Court's failure to ground affirmative action in a
remedial purpose has not merely denied the victims of historical
injustice the affirmative redress that is their due; perhaps equally
devastating, in the long run, the Court's approach damages the
legitimacy and philosophical coherence of our justice system. By
I don't mean only Michigan or Harvard.").
25. See, e.g., Sanford Cloud, Jr., Lecture, The Next Bold Step Toward Racial
Healing and Reconciliation: Dealing with the Legacy ofSlavery, 45 How. L.J. 157,
163 (2001).
2003]
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dressing the "best case" for affirmative action in the morally-
lightweight garments of "diversity," the courts have shorn the case
for affirmative action of its once substantial moral weight. They
have fostered a view among the populace of affirmative action
programs as policies without principled justification. In doing so, the
Courts have not only depleted arguments in favor of affirmative
action of their primary doctrinal, philosophical and moral force; they
have created something that veers in the minds of many critics
perilously close to a remedy without a wrong. Not surprisingly, then,
rather than view such policies as reasonable responses to societal
inequities, many view them as unjustified gifts to an undifferentiated
mass of "minorities." This perpetuates the view that affirmative
action programs are undeserved efforts to compensate not for
deficiencies of our society, but for some more or less vaguely drawn
pathologies more properly located with the beneficiaries
themselves.26 It is no wonder, then, that support for affirmative
action among society, generally, has waned.
Of course, rather than return to a remedial approach, the Grutter
decision further fuses affirmative action jurisprudence with the
diversity rationale, enshrining the most non-threatening and (hence
the most socially acceptable) justification for affirmative action into
Constitutional jurisprudence." In so doing, the Supreme Court
continues the tradition born in Bakke of preferring to cast these
policies as wholly unconnected to a wrong, and hence, morally, if not
legally suspect; of forcing the victims of the wrongs and injuries at
the root of these programs to deny, ignore, or blame themselves for
their unremedied injuries; and, of asking society to undergo the
burdens of what many perceive as implicitly and broadly remedial,
even though the Courts have acknowledged no corresponding societal
wrong.
A more straightforward, ethical and jurisprudentially sound
approach would be to adopt the remedial approach proffered by
Justice Marshall and supported by scholars such as Professor
Lawrence: acknowledge the existence of concrete, substantive
legacies of discrimination and segregation within American society,
and underscore the severe extent to which such injuries deserve
redress under our law. Doing so would recognize victims' injuries,
give society the strong moral justification it seeks for these policies,
and legitimize the system by underscoring and furthering the
corrective justice objectives upon which it ostensibly rests.
26. See, e.g., Richard J. Hemstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve:
Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life (1994).
27. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2329, 2340 (2003).
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lI. MOVING BEYOND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RECKONING WITH
THE HUMAN DIGNITY INJURIES AT THE ROOT OF RACIAL INJUSTICE
CLAIMS
One additional reason for arguing in favor of a remedial
justification of affirmative action is that such a change in focus may
lead courts and policymakers to grapple with the precise nature of the
injuries which make these programs necessary. Indeed, adopting a
remedial justification for affirmative action might have led the courts
to think more deeply about the injuries at stake in these cases, and
might perhaps have led to a greater understanding of the interests that
most compellingly support the broader affirmative action
movement."
I believe that at the heart of racism, race-based oppression and the
legacies of slavery and Jim Crow in America are injuries to the basic
human dignity interests of subordinated races and a thwarting of the
inherent desire for mutual recognition that we all share. Thus, in
addition to the foregoing, returning to a remedial justification for
affirmative action may have the benefit of focusing society on the
human dignity interests injured by racialist practices, and would in
this sense raise our humanity consciousness. " Such a change in focus
is a necessary foundation for a broad program of reform aimed at
restoring human dignity to all which, in my view, necessarily involves
fostering a greater recognition of mutual humanity and essential
interconnectedness of all. Without such a reform in vision, the
legacies of slavery, segregation, exclusionist policies, gender-based
discrimination and a host of similar racialist and dignity-assaulting
practices will continue to leave in place their deeply entrenched
drivers of race-based, dignity-assaulting hierarchy. And the
Reconstruction that is all of society's due will continue to elude us.
Indeed, in a previous article I sought to restate and re-radicalize
the project of the ongoing Reconstruction of post-slavery America.3 °
There I described the education-related goals of what we might call
the Third Reconstruction as central among the humanizing practices
a fully reconstructed society would highlight as among its most
important objectives.3 As one of the most crucial elements of a
dignified existence, a high-quality, humanity-centered education
must be the right of every human being.32 Affirmative action is and
has been one means of ensuring broader access to quality education
28. See generally Lawrence and Matsuda, supra note 1.
29. Andrews, infra note 33, at 489.
30. See generally Andrews, infra note 33.
31. Id. at 552.
32. Id.
2003] 713
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to traditionally disadvantaged groups. At least until the legacies of
slavery, Jim Crow and other racially-subordinating policies are
subjected to adequate remedy, such programs are an important part
of the present patchwork approach to race-related justice.
Affirmative action programs should be reconceived as remedial in
their fundamental objectives, and the perspective of humanity
consciousness should guide their structure and implementation.
I believe that we must see the battle over affirmative action as
symptomatic of a more fundamental challenge facing social
reformers, and not just racial reformers, in post-slavery America.
The ongoing project of post-slavery Reconstruction has never been
envisioned quite broadly enough within mainstream or even critical
perspectives on civil rights law and policy.33 The Reconstruction
vision has never gone so far as to embrace the goal of forging a deep
reconsideration of what it might mean to be a human being in a fully
post-racialized world, and articulating the promises a Constitutional
democracy should be required to fulfill in light of that new
understanding of what it means to be a post-racialized human, of
whatever shade. In the rolling shadows cast by the affirmative
action gladiators, we must begin to see the imperative of addressing
this new, more fundamental, humanity-conscious agenda, and we
must commit to developing law and policy aimed at remaking the
world accordingly. Indeed, the imperative of a broader view on the
scope of the challenge facing those who would further the
reconstruction of post-slavery America was one of King's most
brilliant insights:
The black revolution is much more than a struggle for the
rights of Negroes. It is forcing America to face all its
interrelated flaws-racism, poverty, and militarism. It is
exposing the evils that are rooted deeply in the whole
structure of our society. It reveals systemic rather than
superficial flaws and suggests that radical reconstruction of
society itself is a real issue to be faced.34
33. See Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The ThirdReconstruction: An Alternative
to Race-Consciousness and Colorblindness in Post-Slavery America, 54 Ala. L.
Rev. 483, 501 passim (2003):
[A] truly transformative approach would, at every turn, seek to restore
to a state of dignity every man, woman and child impacted by the
dehumanizing effects of slavery, and to see that restored dignity
reflected, insofar as possible, in the lives of not only the formerly
oppressed but the whole society... [and] raise all Americans to a state
of dignity impossible to all Americans reared in a society whose core
principles remain insufficiently reconstructed from the debilitations of
our slave-holding past and our still racialized present.
34. Martin Luther King, Jr., A Testament of Hope in A Testament of Hope:
714 [Vol. 63
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In short, when reconceived, for example, as an idealistic
movement towards "inclusion of all people in a loving and non-
exploitive human community,"'35 affirmative action has the potential
to lead us toward true Reconstruction.
IV. CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's decision to validate the
University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action admissions
policy along the lines of the diversity-based argument suggested by
Professor Higginbotham, we must face the reality of the inadequate
support for affirmative action that Grutter, Gratz, and similar
challenges to such policies represent. Guided by the Supreme Court,
society has largely withdrawn support for remedially-focused,
corrective justice arguments in favor of affirmative action. And with
no ability to see the continuing legacies of slavery and segregation as
legal problems deserving remedy, society is unable to fully support
relatively modest affirmative action programs. Much less are we, as
a society, able to envision adequately broad social policy reforms,
reforms with the potential, literally, to remake the world.
As one step toward reversing this trend away from a deep
reckoning with the societal implications of our racialist past and still
racialized present, courts and policymakers must return to viewing
affirmative action primarily in remedial terms, and should evaluate
the constitutionality of such programs through the lens of humantiy-
consciousness. Doing so is important because corrective justice must
be a continuing concern of the law and public policy concerning race
in this country. It is important because America's traditionally
disadvantaged have always viewed remedial action as critical to the
Reconstruction of America in the post-slavery era, and the
incorporation of the political thought of these "outsiders" must be
part of that Reconstruction. It is important because viewing
affirmative action in terms of remedy would lay a foundation for
programs and policies which support an understanding of "race" and
its consequences as implicating the denials of human dignity which
affirmative action, properly viewed, seeks to repair. And it thus may
be the necessary foundation for a societal commitment to reforming
society to undertake a much broader program of substantive, dignity-
and humanity-focused social policy reform.
The Essential Writings of Martin Luther King, Jr., ed. James M. Washington 315
(1986).
35. Peter Gabel, The Bank Teller and Other Essays on the Politics of Meaning,
128 (2000).
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The exact shape of this new dignity-inspired, humanity-
conscious law and social policy will arise from a deep
reconsideration of law and public policy in light of these objectives.
However, as Charles Black so eloquently observed at the end of his
esteemed career, "law is reasoning from commitment., 37 The task
before us now is to forge new commitments, to a legal philosophy
which places post-racial human dignity, interconnectedness and love
at the center, and to policies, including reconsidered affirmative
action programs, which reflect such a transformation in
jurisprudence, and law. In short, we must not only dream of new
levels of human community, we must commit to making real those
dreams, and get fast to work.
36. In a forthcoming article, I suggest some specific ways that affirmative
action programs might be reformed with these goals in mind. See, Rhonda V.
Magee Andrews, Toward a Foundation for Rebuilding the House: The Birth of
"Humanity Conscious" Jurisprudence (work-in-progress, on file with author). In
another, I discuss in detail the existential social-psychological obstacles which
reinforce racialization and must be dissolved if we are ever to reach these goals.
See Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The Philosophy of Black Existence as a Guide to
Interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, Temple Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2004).
37. Charles L. Black, Jr., A New Birth of Freedom: Human Rights, Named
and Unnamed 5 (1997).
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